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From Prosecutors and Democracy: A Cross-National Study, edited by Maximo
Langer and David Sklansky (forthcoming 2017)

THE ORGANIZATION OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
William H. Simon

Discussion of prosecution reform is haunted by anachronistic conceptions of judgment
and organization. These conceptions see professional judgment as inherently individual and
ineffable and professional organization as inherently informal and opaque. The appeal of these
conceptions is due in part to the assumption that the only alternative to the judgment and
organization they prescribe is bureaucracy. In fact, post-bureaucratic forms of organization
have become dominant in recent decades in several professions. They key elements of postbureaucratic organization are presumptive rules, root cause analysis, peer review, and
performance measurement. Each of these elements can be found in recent reforms in
prosecution, but the field, like the legal profession generally, lags other occupations. Although
post-bureaucratic reforms are sometimes resisted as inconsistent with democracy, they are better
understood as democracy-reinforcing.
Contemporary understanding of prosecutorial discretion is influenced by anachronistic
conceptions of judgment and organization. These conceptions have lost ground dramatically in
professions like medicine, teaching, and social work. Yet, they remain prominent to a unique
degree in law. They are embedded both in the general professional culture and in legal doctrine.
Innovative prosecutorial practices have emerged in recent decades, but their progress has been
inhibited by attachment to these older conceptions.
The older conceptions understand professional judgment as substantially tacit and
ineffable decision by a single professional grounded in a relatively static and comprehensive
discipline. The associated model of organization emphasizes decentralization, pre-entry training
and certification, and a reactive, complaint-driven approach to error detection.

This view

contrasts professionalism to bureaucracy – decision driven by stable, rigid, and hierarchicallypromulgated rules. The professions operate in realms where bureaucracy is often ineffective,
and the case for professional judgment, traditionally understood, rests in part on the assumption
that it is the only alternative to bureaucracy.
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Yet, models of judgment and organization that are neither bureaucratic nor traditionally
professional have established themselves in many sectors of both the private and public realms.
These models, which might be called post-bureaucratic – or in one important variation,
experimentalist -- see decision as governed by explicit but provisional norms and arising from
multidisciplinary group deliberation. They imply forms of organization that combine local
autonomy with centralized monitoring, foster continuous learning and revision, and take
proactive approaches to error detection and correction.
I appeal in this paper to models of post-bureaucratic or experimentalist organization both
to emphasize the extent to which prosecution has lagged other sectors in its understanding of
judgment and organization and to connect the important innovations that have occurred in
prosecution to developments in other fields.
The analysis of competing conceptions of organization has implications for the relation of
prosecutorial discretion and democracy. Post-bureaucratic organization has two features that
promise to enhance democratic accountability – greater transparency and greater potential for
stakeholder participation.
I. Traditional Premises
The discretion part of “prosecutorial discretion” connotes a combination of flexibility and
discipline that elides arbitrariness on the one hand and regimentation on the other. Our key
paradigm for such activity is the traditional idea of professional judgment.1
In the paradigm, judgment is a decision by an individual applying a discrete body of
university-based knowledge to a particular situation. The decision is presumptively all-thingsconsidered, taking account both the full range of knowledge within the professional field (but not
beyond the field’s boundaries) and of all relevant aspects of the particular situation. It is
substantially tacit and ineffable; it cannot be explained fully to lay people and its correctness
cannot be determined confidently even by peers in a large fraction of instances. And the
decision is difficult to observe, in part, because it is so sensitive to myriad particular facts and in
part because many of these facts are confidential. The disciplines such judgments implement are
understood as stable, and their general effectiveness can only be assessed in informal ways.

1

See Burton Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Emergence of Higher
Education in America (1976); Talcott Parsons, “A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession,” in Essays in
Sociological Theory (Rev. ed 1954).
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This type of judgment implies a distinctive form of organization. Work units tend to be
organized by discipline, with workers supervised by members of the same profession and
physically separated from people in other fields. Offices tend to be relatively decentralized.
Workers are only loosely supervised. Instead, responsibility is assured in substantial part by
licensing controls that certify the adequacy of training and ethical disposition on entry. Learning
on the job occurs most characteristically through informal association with supervisors and
mentors. These mechanisms are supplemented by processes of error-detection and correction
that are initiated by complaints. Although the complaint processes are initiated by clients, the
key judgments are made by, or strongly influenced by, professional peers. Errors are understood
as idiosyncratic and are adjudicated and remedied one-by-one.
This vision of professional judgment has been nowhere more entrenched than in law, and
in particular in the discussion of prosecutorial discretion. Consider three recent examples:
An article by Zachary Price on the political and constitutional dimensions of enforcement
discretion has received a lot of attention, in part because of its pertinence to various controversial
initiatives of the Obama administration, including guidelines for enforcement of immigration,
controlled substance, and health care laws.

In general, Price views as undesirable,

constitutionally suspect, or worse most efforts by prosecutors to discipline or make transparent
their enforcement decisions through explicit rules, guidelines, or general norms. His most
encompassing objection derives from a conception of law and the separation of powers. It rests
on a distinction between “categorical” or “across the board” norms and “individualized” or “case
specific” judgments.

“Executive nonenforcment discretion extends only to case specific

considerations,” he insists.2
This is because wholesale non-enforcement amounts to “making” or “re-making” law,
which is a legislative power, while only retail nonenforcement is consistent with the executive
function of “applying” the law. If, for example, it is impossible or undesirable to enforce the
immigration laws fully against undocumented residents, the executive branch should not specify
the criteria it will use to select residents for deportation but should instead permit such decisions
to be made by frontline agents, asylum officers, and administrative law judges with minimal
guidance other than the statutes and an informal sense of equity.

2

Zachary Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 671, 705 (2014).
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The second example is Connick v. Thompson, in which the Supreme Court considered a
claim that due process required the New Orleans district attorney to train his subordinates about
the constitutional duty to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense. At least one, and
perhaps several, prosecutors in the office had violated this duty in connection with a trial of the
plaintiff years earlier.

At least four other violations by lawyers in the office had been

condemned by the courts in the prior ten years. As far as the record showed, the agency did no
relevant training.

The plaintiffs invoked earlier cases holding that the failure of a police

department to provide training in the use of deadly force could violate the Constitution.
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, rejected the idea that the police cases were relevant
to prosecutors. He emphasized that lawyers, to a far greater extent than police officers, must
undergo lengthy education and then demonstrate their general knowledge on a demanding
examination prior to entering the occupation. “These threshold requirements are designed to
ensure that all new attorneys have learned how to find, understand, and apply legal rules.” In
addition, lawyers are screened at entry for “character and fitness” and subjected to a regime of
peer discipline throughout their careers. The opinion concludes that the senior officials “were
entitled to rely on the prosecutors’ professional training and ethical obligations in the absence of
a specific reason” to believe they were not qualified.3
Finally, Rachel Barkow has advanced a proposal for re-organizing prosecutorial activity
that focuses on the problem of bias. Barkow is worried about the kind of bias that arises from
the design of professional roles. US prosecutors are normally responsible both for investigating
and referring for prosecution on the one hand and for charging, determining what punishment to
seek, and negotiating with the defendant on the other.

Bias arises from the tendency of

prosecutor to identify cognitively and emotionally with the understanding of the case that
emerges in the investigation stage. This makes her resistant to revising this interpretation as new
information emerges later. Barkow’s solution is to sub-divide functions, assigning separate
lawyers to the tasks of investigation and “adjudication” (i.e., charging and plea bargaining).4
The proposal departs from the traditional professional view in dividing the professional decision
in two and bringing in a second decision-maker. But each of the now separate decisions is made
in the traditional manner – by independent individuals under unspecified criteria. Moreover,
3
4

Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1361, 1363 (2010).
Rachel Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869 (2009).
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responding to bias in this manner carries a serious cost: the second decision-maker, by virtue of
his separation from the investigation, may lack information that should be considered in the
“adjudication” decisions.
II. Recent Trends
This traditional view of decision-making is in strong tension with recent thinking in many
fields about the nature of decision-making and its implications for institutional design. In field
after field, practices have been re-designed on the basis of an opposed understanding. 5
In the first place, this opposed understanding rejects any strong distinction between
categorical and individualized decision-making.
always categorical.

6

Psychologists demonstrate that thinking is

People process decisions through implicit criteria derived both from

idiosyncratic social experience and the surrounding culture.

Social scientists observing

individual decisions over many cases can infer the implicit criteria even though the subjects may
be unaware of them. A mandate like Price’s for individualized decisions does not result in
unmediated contextuality, but rather decisions governed by tacit and perhaps unconscious criteria
over more explicit and reflective ones.
Such a mandate has serious costs. To some extent the implicit criteria that generate
ostensibly individual decisions will vary across decision-makers, thus violating the value of
horizontal equity. Such inconsistency is often invisible, but immigration asylum decisions
provide an unusually salient and troubling example of it. The rates of asylum decisions in favor
of applicants vary enormously and persistently among adjudicators. 7 Since cases are randomly
assigned and each adjudicator decides many cases, it is hard to account for these variations other
than as manifestations of idiosyncratic adjudicator views.

Moreover, even where the tacit

criteria influencing decisions reflect widely shared social dispositions, they may be illegitimate.
For example, the pervasive unconscious influence of racial bias has been elaborately
demonstrated in many other areas.8
5

See generally, Charles F. Sabel, A Real Time Revolution in Routines, in The Corporation as a Collaborative
Community (Paul Adler and Charles Hecksher, ed.s 2006); Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Minimalism and
Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 Georgetown L. J. 58 (2011).
6
See, e.g., Steven Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind (2003).
7
Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in
Asylum Adjudication, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 295 (2007).
8
See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (2015), Slip Op. at 10-17 (discussing numerous
statistical studies of the death penalty that conclude that its application does not correlate with plausible criteria of
relative egregiousness and/or that it does correlate with factors that should not be considered, notably race). Note

5

In modern industrial organization, designers reject the tacit particularistic decisionmaking associated with traditional “craft”-style production (an industrial analogue to
professionalism). They insist that tacit norms be made explicit. The craftsmen will rely on a
learned, inarticulate sense of appositeness in deciding, say, how to apply stain to a table and what
level of finish should be deemed adequate. Modern production insists these norms be made
explicit and precise.9 There are three reasons for this insistence. The process by which norms
are articulated requires reflection that improves the quality of decisions. Explicit norms can be
taught more quickly to newcomers. The learning model common to professionals and craft
workers in which young workers learn from their seniors through a kind of informal osmosis has
been discarded as inefficient. And most importantly, decisions under explicit norms are more
transparent to observers; so they are more easily assessed and changed. The traditional model
assumes a relatively stable body of specialized knowledge. But many fields face intensified
pressure to adapt to changing circumstances.
Moreover, in the opposed understanding of judgment, the paradigmatic decision-maker is
no longer an individual but a group that draws, not on a single discipline, but on several. Group
decisions tend to be more consistent than individual ones, and they can synthesize a broader
range of knowledge. Moreover, individual participants in groups feel pressure to consciously
consider and articulate matters they would take for granted in solitary or more homogeneous
settings.
Group decision-making is in part a response to the problem of professional bias that
Barkow addresses. Bias is addressed by forcing individuals to articulate their premises and lay
them open to challenge. A diverse group will likely contain people who do not suffer from any
particular bias (or who may have offsetting ones). This approach avoids the disadvantage of
Barkow’s suggested remedy of sub-dividing the decision among different individuals. The
second decision-maker avoids the bias of the first only at the cost of less information about the
case.
At the same time, decisions tend to be multidisciplinary. This tendency responds to two
developments. One is the evolution of perceptions of social problems. Some pressing problems
also Justice Thomas’s reply in his concurrence that statistical results are unpersuasive in part because the analysts
must abstract from the rich particularity observed by judges and juries at the trials. Slip Op. at 4-6. The reply misses
the point of the analyses, which purport to show that the decisions are being driven by tacit criteria rather than
ineffable particularity.
9
E.g., Productivity Press Development Team, Standard Work for the Shop Floor (2002).
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that were not salient when the modern professional disciplines were established implicate
multiple disciplines.

Mental health and substance abuse, for example, are viewed as

simultaneously public health and law enforcement problems.

At the same time, evolving

understandings of organization suggest greater capacity to coordinate interventions across
disciplines and across institutional separations. When complex judgment at the organizational
frontline was the exclusive province of the individual professional, and the individual
professional was nested in a predominantly bureaucratic organization, coordination across
organizational boundaries was difficult. More flexible contemporary organizational forms open
up greater possibilities.
Professionals often resist the move away from the traditional understanding of judgment
because they assume such a move would entail bureaucratic organization.

They resist

bureaucracy because it threatens individual fairness by regimenting judgment. In addition, while
bureaucracy is superficially more compatible with public accountability than professionalism, in
practice it can be equally opaque. Modern organizations that purport to operate in hierarchical,
rule-governed manner described by Max Weber and Frederick Taylor in fact make room for a lot
of frontline discretion. This discretion tends to be exercised informally on the basis of tacit peer
cultures, and it tends to be substantially unobservable by supervisors and the public. Frontline
agents (“street-level bureaucrats”) can depart from the rules both for benign reasons (when the
rules dictate patently unjust or inefficient decisions) and malign ones. Supervisors tolerate lowvisibility rule departures either because the limits of their capacity to monitor leave them no
choice or because they favor the benign departures.

But benign or malign, low-visibility

discretion is unaccountable except perhaps through the kind of socialization and recruitment
controls that the critics assert make professionalism an inadequate mode of organization for the
tasks in question.10
In fact, bureaucracy is not the only alternative to loose, informal decentralization favored
by traditional professionalism. Major trends in important sectors of both private and public
organization have produced a post-bureaucratic model of organization.

Post-bureaucratic

organization responds to the demands for adaptive and individualizing capacities in a world
where uniform answers are undesirable and tacit cultural understanding is indeterminate. It
10

Alvin Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (1954); Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy

(1980).
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repudiates both inflexible rules and low-visibility discretion. Decision-making in these regimes
tends to be group and multidisciplinary. Accountability does not depend on either on monitoring
compliance with fixed rules or socialization into an ineffable culture. The most distinctive
mechanisms are (1) presumptive rules; (2) root cause analysis of unexpected events; (3) peer
review; and (4) performance measurement.11
All these features can be observed in current prosecution practice. However, they seem
less widespread and deep-rooted here than in other fields, and as Price, Thomas, and Barkow
illustrate, they are often ignored or misunderstood. Indeed where we find prosecutors involved
in sophisticated post-bureaucratic regimes, they often seem to have been pulled in by leaders in
fields other than law.

Problem-Oriented Policing, which has reconceived crime control

strategies, and the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, which has transformed pretrial
detention of juveniles, are examples.12 Prosecutors play important roles in both, but most of the
pioneering work has been done, in the first, by police officers and criminal justice academics
and, in the second, by probation officers and sociologists. The greater prestige and longer
history of law as a professional discipline relative to these other fields may have been liabilities
that have inhibited reconception of practice.
The most general contours of the move toward post-bureaucratic organization figure in
what Catherine Coles describes as a trend away from “the felony case processing model” toward
“the community prosecution model” The first model defines its goal as the maximization of
convictions, weighted by seriousness of the crimes. Convictions are not ends in themselves, but
the model assumes that they are the only relevant means of attaining the ultimate goals, so that
there is no need for practitioners to refer directly to these goals in their decision-making.
Decisions in this model are made by lawyers, often with frontline actors exercising substantial
autonomy and “operat[ing]in relative isolation from other agencies” and stakeholders.13

11

For example, see Charles Kenney, The Best Practice: How the New Quality Movement is Transforming
Medicine (2010); Anthony Bryk et al., Learning to Improve: How America’s Schools Can Get Better at Getting
Better (2015). On the lagging position of the legal profession, see William H. Simon, Where Is the Quality
Movement in Law Practice?, 2012 Wis. L. Rev. 387.
12
See Herman Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing (1990); Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative,
Juvenile Detention Risk Assessment: A Practice Guide to Juvenile Detention Reform (2006); Juvenile Detention
Alternatives Initiative, Two Decades of JDAI (2009).
13
Catherine Coles, Evolving Strategies in 20th Century American Prosecution in The Changing role of the
American Prosecutor 177-209 (John L. Worrall and M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove ed.s 2008).
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In the Community Prosecution model, decision-makers are guided directly by the
ultimate goals of public safety and quality of life. The model assumes that felony prosecution is
not a uniformly effective intervention and that, even when it is effective, it is best combined with
other strategies. The goal is to craft solutions tailored to specific problems. Lawyers work in
offices with non-lawyer specialists and engage continuously with other agencies and
stakeholders.
The term “community prosecution” connotes local initiatives, but the post-bureaucratic
architecture Coles describes can be applied to initiatives on any scale. Ideally, local efforts are
linked through central institutions that measure effectiveness and pool information on the relative
success of different strategies. At the same time, national and international interventions can
devolve operating initiatives to frontline actors while monitoring and analyzing their efficacy.
III. Elements of Post-Bureaucratic Organization
At any scale, the key features of post-bureaucratic organization are the presumptive rule,
root cause analysis, peer review, and performance measurement. Note that each challenges the
traditional dichotomy between bureaucratic and professional organization, and the associated
premises that we must choose between rule-based and standards-based judgment and between
centralized and decentralized organization.
A. Presumptive Rule
A presumptive rule is neither a rule (a norm that dictates decision on the basis of a
limited number of specified factors) nor a standard (a general value to be furthered by an allthings-considered judgment). A presumptive rule is more specific than a standard, but unlike a
bureaucratic rule, those to whom it is addressed are expected to depart from it in circumstances
where it would be counter-productive to follow it. The departure, however, must be signaled,
and it triggers an immediate review of the departure. When the departure is sustained, the rule
gets re-written to reflect the new understanding achieved through review.
Practice under a regime of presumptive rules is more transparent because it conforms
more tightly to the rules than in a conventional bureaucracy. Practice is also more self-conscious
since actors must justify decisions that would be taken for granted in a rule-governed regime. In
a bureaucracy, following the rule is always an acceptable explanation, and rule departures are
generally unobserved or ignored. But in a post-bureaucratic regime, following the rule is not
appropriate where doing so would be counter-productive, and departures must be transparent. A
9

key goal is to induce and facilitate learning. This occurs in two ways. The duty to depart when
the rules are ineffective and to signal departure feeds back information from the frontline that
facilitates revision.

Second, as I will shortly emphasize, experimentalist regimes subject

practices to testing, and only explicit practices can be tested with any rigor.
Constitutional doctrine on prosecution has shown little concern with internal
administration. The courts insist that administrators respond to indications of frontline violations
of rules they themselves have promulgated, but where those rules (and relevant statutes) leave
prosecutors discretion, they seem indifferent to whether offices take initiative to structure that
discretion.14
Practice is thus free to vary, and it does widely. In some quarters, judgments are left to
informal processes and minimally supervised individual decision-making. But we also find
sophisticated policy manuals that make use of the presumptive rule. The Department of Justice
U.S. Attorneys Manual is a notable example. It sets out some policies in detail and then says that
local offices may depart from them “[i]n the interests of fair and effective law enforcement” but
only with the approval of the appropriate Assistant Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney
General.15
The Attorneys Manual deals mostly with trans-substantive rules that apply to practices
that recur across various initiatives. They do not cover some important practices, and they do not
deal in detail with decisions about the allocation of resources across initiatives or with the
strategic configuration of particular initiatives. In a fully articulated presumptive rule regime,
the rules form a plan that reflects a coherent but provisional understanding of the relevant
mission. The plan is revised periodically both in both piecemeal and overall re-assessments. A
comprehensive plan embraces sets of more specific plans.
Plans of this kind are most readily found in some self-consciously reformist initiatives,
such as drug courts and problem-oriented policing. Problem-oriented policing was developed
14

See Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, The Duty of Responsible Administration and the Problem of
Police Accountability, 34 Yale J. on Reg. 165 (2016). For example, Connick v. Thompson notes that some of the
prosecutors in the case were uncertain whether they had a Brady duty to turn over or test blood evidence that might
turn out to be exculpatory if tested but had not been tested. The opinion assumes that, if Brady did not apply, there
was no constitutional problem. No one suggested that the prosecutors had a duty to clarify this issue internally with
their own rule, though that is what basic norms of good management required once the issue was identified.
15
US Attorneys Manual 9-27.140. In a fully developed post-bureaucratic regime, the rules would be
periodically reconsidered and re-written in the light of approved departures. There is no indication that this happens
systematically in the Department of Justice.
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mostly in the policing field, but it necessarily involves prosecutors. At the frontline, it involves
local plans focused on geographical sites associated with recurring criminal activity or
individuals or groups engaged persistently in criminal activity. Multidisciplinary teams engage
with stakeholders to craft interventions and then periodically re-assess their efficacy. The initial
intervention is codified in an explicit plan that gets reconsidered in the light of experience. The
plan is thus a set of presumptive rules.
The shift from informal standards associated with professionalism to the presumptive rule
is salient in the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative. The initiative is a network of local
criminal justice agencies supported by a foundation and responsive to a federal statutory mandate
that the agencies produce and implement plans to reduce disparate racial impacts from their
activities. A central reform that has emerged is the development of numerical Risk Assessment
Instruments to govern pretrial detention decisions.
The story parallels the one told about baseball recruiting in Michael Lewis’s Moneyball.
Traditionally, probation officers made detention issues through minimally supervised individual
all-things-considered judgments.

Reformers believed that these judgments tended to be

inconsistent, but there was no way to tell for sure because of limited review and the absence of
articulated norms. Gradually this process has been replaced by one in which a scorecard dictates
decision on the basis of numerically scored indicators, such as prior offenses, school attendance,
or substance abuse. The scorecard is a presumptive rule. The decisions it dictates can be
overridden, but only with the approval of a supervisor. When the scoring norms are periodically
reviewed, reviewers look at overrides to see if they suggest inadequacies in the rules. The
reforms have led to more consistent judgments and have made it possible to investigate the
predictive power of the indicators. They seem to have contributed to declines in detention in
most jurisdictions that have adopted them and to have reduced racial disparities in some.
B. Root Cause Analysis of Significant Operating Events
A significant operating event is an occurrence involving actual or potential harm that is
unexpected or cannot be immediately explained. Examples include abnormal adverse health
events in hospitals or “near misses” in aviation. Bureaucracy tends to treat such events as
idiosyncratic. It tends to ignore the ones that do not involve tangible harm. It tends to respond
to harm by sanctioning those responsible and/or compensating those who suffer the harm.

11

Post-bureaucratic organization requires more.

Rather than viewing such events as

idiosyncratic, it sees them as symptoms of potential systemic problems. Thus, it subjects them to
root cause analysis. It traces the causal stage back through the system. The “5 Whys” slogan
from the Toyota Production System suggests as a rule-of-thumb that the analysis goes back five
stages. The goal is to use the event as a learning opportunity by exploiting its diagnostic
significance.
For example, a Brady violation could signal a need for training of a particular prosecutor,
a need for better information technology to track evidence and disclosure, or better
communication between police and prosecutor, or clearer assignment of responsibilities for
Brady compliance among those responsible for a case.

Assigning blame to a particular

prosecutor will not necessarily distinguish among these explanations, nor will sanctioning the
prosecutor or compensating the defendant guarantee that the problem will be remedied. Root
cause analysis insists on ambitious diagnosis and remediation.
Such practices, however, are little developed in prosecution. The courts rely mainly on
end-of-the-pipe punitive and compensatory remedies. A defendant who can show misconduct
may get evidence suppressed or a case dismissed or damages. However, such remedies are
available only in the case of actual tangible harm, and they require proof that is often
unavailable. Moreover, they have small deterrent effect, since the responsible officials virtually
never bear their costs. Post-conviction exonerations have been numerous in recent years, often
prompted by DNA analysis. The discovery of a wrongful conviction is an unexpected adverse
event of the sort that would prompt root cause analysis in many fields. Hospitals, for example,
conduct searing “mortality-morbidity” reviews in comparable circumstances.

But no such

practice is standard in prosecution.16
Disciplinary sanctions for prosecutor misconduct are rarely considered, much less
applied. Justice Thomas in the Connick case did not even consider it relevant to ask whether the
office in question had a functioning disciplinary process or what the likelihood was that the
Louisiana bar would sanction an erring prosecutor. Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit
recently expressed great frustration at this situation and took the extraordinary step of demanding

16

See, e.g., James Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Columbia Law Review 2030 (2000).

12

that the California attorney general explain why her office had not filed criminal charges against
a prosecutor who lied in an early stage of the case before him.17
It is important to sanction willful violations, but doing so is not adequate, and the focus
on egregious cases can have perverse effects. Post-bureaucracy urges intervention, not just to
induce compliance with clear obligations, but to promote learning. Many events that do not
imply willful wrongdoing may yield diagnostic intervention. A search for causes can be
informative and lead to valuable reforms. The “after action” reviews undertaken sometimes in
high-profile cases can facilitate valuable inquiry of this sort.18

If retrospective inquiry is

predominantly associated with punishment or humiliation, it may have two unfortunate effects.
Actors will hide or misreport information for fear it will used to inculpate them. And peers will
be reluctant to express reservations about each other’s performance, since criticism implies
incompetence or immorality.
C. Peer Review
In the broadest sense, peer review refers to review of practice decisions by people
working in the same field as those who made the decisions in question. As such, it overlaps the
other elements of the post-bureaucratic approach.

Here, however, I use the term more

specifically to refer to relatively intense and qualitative review by peers of representative or
exceptionally challenging decisions or practices.

“Peer” is a capacious and somewhat

ambiguous term in a world where decisions are typically multidisciplinary.

The key

desideraturm is that review involve people working on comparable problems. Police officers or
social workers might be appropriate members of a peer review team for a prosecutor or
prosecutorial office. Reviewers could come from inside or outside the office.
Peer review is above all a learning process. The lawyer under review learns both by selfassessment and explanation of his decisions and by critical response from the reviewers. At the
same time, peer review promotes the exchange of information across lawyers in the same office,
and where the reviewers are outsiders, across offices.

This means that lawyers can learn

alternative approaches and benefit from others’ experiences with them. It also tends to make

17

Johnny Baca v. Derral Adams, YOUTUBE (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v_2sCUrhgXjH4.; see also the critique of de facto immunity for prosecutorial misconduct in Alex Kozinski,
Preface: Criminal Law 2.0, 44 Geo. L. J. Ann. Rev. Crime. Proc. xxxv-xli (2015)
18
Erin Murphy and David Sklansky, Science, Suspects, and Systems: Lessons from the Anthrax Investigation,
8 Issues in Legal Scholarship 1, 34-39 (2009).
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practice decisions more consistent to the extent the peers develop a shared understanding that
informs their decisions.
Peer review is most extensively developed in medicine. It takes various forms. In
addition to “mortality-morbidity” reviews of adverse events, there is professional recertification
review in which a particular practitioner’s practice over a period of time is examined. And there
is institutional certification review in which a hospital’s operations and structures are assessed
periodically. In addition, peer review can focus on particular practices; new treatments, where
formal clinical trials are impracticable, are assessed through informal peer discussion.19
All these variations could be readily applied to law and to prosecution in particular.
Perhaps the most ambitious involve the kind of intense qualitative discussion of particular cases
of a sort exemplified in “morality-morbidity” reviews. The review need not be focused on cases
with bad outcomes. It could draw random samples of cases, stratified to capture relevant
categories where appropriate. Kathleen Noonan, Charles Sabel, and I have described such a
procedure employed by social workers in some child welfare systems.20 It is hard to find
ambitious versions of such systems in law, and they are sometimes actively resisted. Gary
Bellow once proposed and experimented with a version of such a system among civil legal aid
programs.

Observers were surprised both by the volume of errors or suggestions for

improvement that reviewers found or made and by the amount of resistance by practitioners to
the process, even when it was divorced from personnel or compensation decisions. 21
Outside reviewers in law may create risks to preserving confidentiality. These concerns
are less severe with prosecutors than in other areas. Since the client – the government -- has a
long-term interest in the quality of its lawyers’ work, consent should be easier to get. And in any
event, the concern is also present in medicine but has been overcome there with the help of
facilitative legislation.
Even when review is done by insiders,, the bar has tended toward indifference if not
hostility. The American Bar Association flirted with the idea of prescribing that firms institute
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internal peer review procedures but quietly gave up the idea. 22 The bar has moved beyond the
traditional idea that key professional learning takes place prior to certification by mandating
“continuing legal education”. But these programs, even when well prepared, rarely focus on
particular practice decisions in richly observed contexts.
D. Performance Measurement
Performance is measured by translating the institution’s goals into metrics and then
periodically applying them. This was once a radical idea in the professions, and it is still
controversial, but it has received increasing attention. Writing about a major federal gun-control
initiative, Coles observes: “[I]t is likely the case that most U.S. Attroneys knew little about their
cities’ homicide rates. Project Safe Neighborhoods has changed that, prompting attention to the
nature of decline (or increase) in [their] jurisdiction’s homicide rate.”23
Performance metrics can measure process (such as charges filed) or outcome (such as
convictions, or looking to ultimate outcomes, crime rates). Process metrics indicate whether
plans are being implemented; outcome metrics indicate whether they are working. Without the
process metrics, we don’t know what practices are contributing to the outcomes; without the
outcome metrics, we don’t what the effects of the interventions are. A good set of metrics
includes both types in a “balanced scorecard”.24
Metrics can be used to induce compliance with instructions, or they can be used
diagnostically to revise and adapt instructions.

The two functions are not entirely

complementary. In order to use metrics to reinforce incentives, one needs to be confident about
what practices one wants to induce people to undertake, and one must be able to define them
with reasonable precision and comprehensiveness. Metrics attached to rewards and sanctions can
have well-known perverse effects, especially when the metrics are incomplete. They may drive
behavior to goals captured by the metrics and away from ones not captured. “Teaching to the
test” in education is the classic example.

Maximizing convictions is the corresponding

phenomenon in prosecution. Conviction rates alone do not tell us whether convictions were
achieved ethically, how much resources were used to obtain them, the collateral social costs of
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the convictions, the relative priority of the crimes prosecuted, or the deterrent effect of the
convictions.
In situations where there is uncertainty about the relevant practice and monitoring is
designed to facilitate learning, the stakes for individuals have to be lowered. Metrics have to be
provisional, and provisional metrics do not fit well with rewards and punishments because low
scores are as likely to reflect the inadequacy of the measures as the quality of the performance.
From the learning perspective, metrics have three functions. First, the process of defining
the metrics and interpreting their application structures and disciplines ongoing assessment of the
relevant practices. For example, discussion has recently arisen with respect to Compstat-style
assertive policing regimes about whether the number of arrests should be treated as a measure of
success or as a cost. Many departments have viewed it as a measure of success, but critics assert
that this practice ignores the harm such arrests do in creating criminal records that impair the life
chances of a broad segment of the community. Requiring that the program specify metrics may
cause the issue to surface earlier and the discussion to become more precise.
Second, measurements produce information about the system that can guide reform.
Pretrial juvenile detention is an interesting case because there are only two permissible grounds
for such detention -- likely failure to appear for court proceedings or re-offense – and both are
easily observable. Thus, once decision criteria are made explicit as they are in the scorecards,
their predictive power can be readily studied. The Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiatives
regime mandates that the criteria be validated initially and periodically thereafter in the light of
experience. The validation studies are sometimes quite sophisticated, and the scorecards have
often been revised.
Third, the metrics, when applied across comparable institutions or individuals, indicate
relatively effective and ineffective actors. The relatively successful are studied for lessons about
what produces success.

The laggards are subject to intensified supervision and technical

assistance. In the diagnostic perspective, failure is presumed until proven otherwise to result
from incapacity rather than willfulness.
The most common use of metrics in prosecution appears to be in assessing the relative
effectiveness of individual prosecutors for promotion purposes.25 However, there are more
25
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ambitious efforts. Some offices monitor charging practices in order to ensure consistency and
compliance with policies about evidence quality and prosecution priorities.26
The most sophisticated efforts combine aggregate metrics with ongoing rule revision,
root cause analysis, and peer review. Examples can be found in initiatives inspired by the Vera
Institute Project on Racial Justice.

In the manner of the Juvenile Detention Alternatives

Initiative, the program prescribes ongoing monitoring of racial disparities in the effects of
prosecution practices, root cause analysis of disparities, and scanning for reforms that might
mitigate the disparities. In Milwaukee, for example, sophisticated implementation that included
revisions of charging practices and the development of diversion programs has significantly
reduced disparities.27
Another example is the “focused deterrence” strategy that starts by identifying violenceprone actors through intensive surveillance and then offers them a package of moral exhortation,
threats of prosecution for past offenses, and offers of social services (for example, job training or
substance abuse treatment). A distinctive component of the regime is the “call in” which invites
(or in the case of probationers, requires) attendance at a meeting where prosecutors, community
leaders, police, and social workers make presentation. In addition to creating tangible incentives
for compliance, the intervention is designed to leverage peer relations by threatening or
promising group punishments or benefits. Many focused deterrence regimes have been studied
with rigor. An example from Cincinnati illustrates how measurement has been sufficiently finegrained to yield information useful for reconfiguring the program to eliminate or revise specific
ineffective elements.28
IV. Democracy
We generally think of democratic accountability in terms of elections or the more diffuse
pressures of public opinion. There is some ambiguity about the range of prosecutorial activity
that should be controlled democratically. In some respects, prosecutors resemble judges. They
make decisions of great consequence that should be made disinterestedly and reflectively on the
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basis of general, public, and prospective norms. Since public pressure can be infected by
considerations that prosecutors are obliged to ignore in these decisions, it risks compromising
fairness.

At the same time, prosecutors are executive officials commanding resources and

exercising discretion in ways that have broad impact on their communities. The public has a
clear stake in the general efficiency and fairness of prosecutorial practice and in the ways
prosecutors exercise discretion within the interstices of enacted law.
Public accountability seems most productive and least dangerous to fairness values when
it focuses on general patterns of practice rather than individual decisions. Unfortunately, this has
not been the traditional focus of discussion. Prosecution often has a low profile in elections and
public debate. Incumbents running for re-election are often unchallenged and usually re-elected.
Moreover, where there is appraisal, it tends not to focus on general patterns. Discussion of
practice tends to focus on a few high-profile cases. Otherwise, discussion is pre-occupied with
the background qualifications and character of the candidates.29
This situation is in part a function of the traditional conception of prosecutorial work that
emphasizes individual, ineffable judgment. We have seen that the traditional conception puts
great emphasis on character and qualifications because it assumes that individual judgments are
difficult to assess. In addition, the traditional conception assumes that judgment is necessarily
idiosyncratic and ineffable; so it resists efforts to cabin discretion through explicit rules or to
measure its effects. Practice under these assumptions is necessarily opaque.
The post-bureaucratic trends in the organization of prosecutorial discretion have two
broad implications for democratic control of prosecutorial power. First, the basic tendency of
post-bureaucratic reform is to make the broader system transparent in a way that increases
control and adaptive capacity by insiders and outsiders alike. These reforms potentially enhance
both fairness and accountability. Charles Sabel and I have argued that there is (or should be) a
duty of responsible administration that requires administrators to adopt reforms to manage
transparently so that courts and citizens can assess their compliance with substantive norms. 30
We find this duty in convergent themes of constitutional, statutory and common law, as they
have been applied to a range of public institutions, including, prisons, police departments, and
welfare programs. Courts have been reluctant to put such pressure on prosecution offices, in part
29
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because of the persistence of the traditional conception of prosecutorial judgment and the related
assumption that accountability must take bureaucratic forms that would rigidify practice
inappropriately. But initiatives from prosecutors themselves have demonstrated that there are
ways of structuring discretion that enhance transparency without strait-jacketing practice. Courts
could draw on these efforts to induce reforms by recalcitrant offices.
The “duty of responsible administration” idea runs directly counter to arguments like
Price’s that find the self-conscious structuring of prosecutorial discretion as an illegitimate
assertion of law-making powers by executive officials. Price’s argument implies that internal
regulation enhances the power of senior administrators, rather than making it more accountable.
This is wrong. A top administrator who wants to impose her will on the frontline has many tools
for doing so without rule-making and transparent forms of review. She can, for example, make
hiring, promotion, and compensation decisions on the basis of low-visibility signals of loyalty to
her goals. Moreover, even where top officials leave broad autonomy to the frontline, there is no
reason to assume that frontline decisions are benign. Without structure, frontline decisions may
reflect the prejudices of the agents or may turn out to vary in arbitrary ways.
Second, the post-bureaucratic reforms often appeal to a conception of democracy
somewhat different from the one that emphasizes elections. This alternative conception has
attractive features, and it suggests the possibility of a thicker form of political legitimation.
The alternative conception is stakeholder democracy. Here decisions should be made,
where feasible, locally by the people most affected and knowledgeable about them. General
elections are inadequate both because they bundle far too many issues for people to make and
register informed decisions about, and because they weigh all votes equally on all issues without
regard to intensity of knowledge or interest.31 (Some account of intensity is taken in the design
of jurisdictions and the assignment of issues to them, but within even local jurisdictions there is a
wide variation in knowledge and personal stake on many issues.)
Stakeholder democracy has to deal with the problem of who to admit to participation and
how to reconcile differences when stakeholders disagree. But to the extent that representatives
of diverse interests can come close to consensus on local interventions, they may confer a kind of
democratic legitimacy that is unavailable in other processes. Even when stakeholders do not
31
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agree, their engagement may produce information that can influence official decision in ways
that make it more acceptable.
The stakeholder conception resonates with various initiatives associated with
“community prosecution”. These initiatives are driven by the perceptions that, to the extent that
the process is concerned with justice for victims, it should be more directly responsive to them;
and to the extent it is concerned with deterrence, its efforts are most efficiently configured when
coordinated with actions of other institutions and citizens and when they are configured in the
light of information that can best be extracted through broad consultation.
In the stakeholder conception, the legislature’s role is not to authorize specific decisions
prospectively. Rather, the legislature sets basic parameters and provides resources for local
deliberations and for central review of their efficacy.

The legislature then retrospectively

assesses the success of various intervention, perhaps mandating continuing experimentation
where they are ineffective and perhaps codifying or promoting specific ones where success has
been demonstrated.
Stakeholder participation is not necessarily beneficial. It can involve unproductive and
expensive process costs and capture by unrepresentative sub-constituencies. But it has the
potential to vindicate a different but complementary ideal of democracy from the one usually
assumed in discussion of prosecutorial discretion.
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